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Theories of Knowledge: Fate and Forgetting in the Early Works of Walter
Benjamin
Abstract
Philosophy, and the part of it devoted to epistemology or theories of knowledge, were the site of Walter
Benjamin's early training and writing. Simultaneously, he turned toward a critical conception of experience
and what he called the linguistic essence of knowledge. This turn manifested itself in a series of writings,
all of which focused on ways in which knowledge might emerge from the reading of signs. Knowledge of
fate or character, of the future or the present of persons and languages, is embedded within a theory of
reading as the noting of signs qua signs. Images appear as the signs for such signs, and the problem of
reading images becomes the image for a theory of reading. Through readings of selected passages from
writings dating from the teens through the early thirties—principally "Fate and Character," "Oneway Street,"
"On the Image of Proust," and "Berlin Chronicle"—Benjamin's themes of fate and character, remembering
and forgetting, are shown to display a fate of reading: the fate at once to see reading, to forget it, and to
read this forgetting.
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Our knowledge of Walter Benjamin's writings tends today to divide into broadly theoretical constructions and intensely discrete.
often microscopic examinations. This corresponds. no doubt, to two
aspects of his work and career that were constants from beginning to
end. Whether, in his earliest writings, he was attempting fundamental
reflections on the theory of language at the same time that he was
producing one of the first detailed interpretations of HOlderlin's
poems, or in his last works, he was reflecting critically on our entire
tradition's constructions of history as he was also pursuing highly
specific studies of Baudelaire and nineteenth-century Paris, Benjamin
seems always to have had it both ways. But Benjamin's "two-way
street" becomes our divided highway when we seem unable to cross
easily from a theory of literature or cultural signification to the
minutiae of a reading of literature or images-and when his quick
exchanges between theory and reading. become, under our interpretations, less well-marked cloverleaves than grid-locked textual
passages.

Our divided views and attempted appropriations of Benjamin
and his work may be construed according to another familiar pattern.
Benjamin, it is said, started out as a philosopher and became a critic, a
close reader of literature. And yet the later, literary-interpretive work
continued to generate both fundamental epistemological critiques and
universalizing theories of kinds of meaning and representation. The
philosopher reads literature, and his readers must then read language
and literature reverting, under his hands and eyes, toward philosophic
47
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labor and statement. This difficult exchange is familiar to us in the
recent and ongoing example of Paul de Man. De Man was also one of
the very first in this country, in the sixties, to introduce Benjamin's
work into our discussions of literature, and Benjamin remained one of
de Man's last texts-indeed, for the text for his last lecture, on
Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator." So our problem with
Benjamin, the problem of our bifurcated knowledge of his intertwined
productions, appears also as a larger present problem in literary
studies: the question of a theory of language and literature and their
reading that always departs from and returns to the specifics, the
"minute particulars" of textual reading, while pulling the latter
toward a more global understanding.
A version of Benjamin's itinerary that sketched an uneasy move
from philosophy to literature would be overly hasty and probably
unilluminating for those who are not already familiar with his early
work, for his years of technical study and training in philosophy are
themselves marked by several shifts in terminology and aim. These
shifts can perhaps best be approached by noting his changing attitude
toward what we may call "theory of knowledge." In the rather specific
senses in which Benjamin uses the terms Erkenntnistheorie and
Erkenntniskritik-closer to epistemology and epistemological
critique than to our current and often loose uses of "theory," as in the
phrases "doing theory" or "literary theory"-one may note the
stretching and expanding of terms that comes to characterize much of
his work: he uses the terms, and criticizes and extends them in his
usage. Much could be learned from a sustained study of his early
involvement with and gradual reworking of the problem of "theories
of knowledge": a few introductory and tentative remarks must suffice
here.
In his philosophy dissertation on "The Concept of Kunsikritik in
German Romanticism," Benjamin writes of a theory or concept (of
Kunst or of Kunstkritik, in his example) being "founded upon
epistemological assumptions" ("auf erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen fundiert").' At about the same time he could write to his
friend Gerhard Scholem, in answer to the question of "how I can live
with my particular attitude toward the Kantian system," that "I am constantly at work to make this life possible for myself through insight into
epistemology."' In both remarks, one notes the foundational, grounding effort to establish the epistemological assumptions or conditions
of possibility for a theory or a life directed toward theory. The
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol11/iss1/4
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same passage from the dissertation continues to the effect that, in the
case of Friedrich Schlegel, these assumptions are "most closely
bound to extra-logical, aesthetic determinations" ("auf engste in den
ausserlogischen, asthetischen Bestimmungen gebunden "). At first
glance, and in isolation, this remark would appear to be of a piece with
what is called Benjamin's early Kantianism, an interest initiated by
contact with the teaching of Heinrich Rickert and the writings of Hermann Cohen, and gradually, indeed haltingly, developed across some
five or six years of actually reading Kant's texts (1912-18). But we
know that very shortly before writing this, he was also writing the
devastating critique of Kantian epistemology that was posthumously
published as "The Program of the Coming Philosophy," in which
Kant's concept of knowledge is variously criticized as having been
based upon an inferior, atemporal, mechanistic, empirical or psychologistic concept of experience, and in which Benjamin calls for a concept of experience that would be metaphysical, transcendental and
avowedly religious. When this brief programmatic text closes with an
invocation of the problem that Kant is said to have allowed himself to
forget-namely, "the fact that all philosophical knowledge has its sole
expression in language" -and as it calls for "a concept of knowledge
gained in reflection upon the linguistic essence of knowledge [which'
will create a corresponding concept of experience,"' Benjamin is indicating an itinerary along which certain models and assumptions for
epistemology are already being forgotten, while problems of language and linguistic "experience" increasingly emerge and shape his
work to come.
The years in question, and especially 1917 and 1918, document
a turn in Benjamin's thoughts on a prospective dissertation topic from
Kant and history to Jena romanticism and criticism,' and so does the
dissertation itself rapidly turn from such an initial remark suggesting
some kind of aesthetic intuition as a ground or foundation for knowledge, to an exposition of the ways in which problems of knowledge
(Erkenntnis), intuition (Anschauung), and intellectual intuition are
embedded in the thinking of reflexivity in the early romantics. The
dissertation's pages on reflexion and positing (Setzung) in Fichte,
Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel yield summary statements on
Schlegel such as these: "Reflexion is no intuiting skein Anschauenl,
but rather an absolutely systematic thinking, a conceiving Iein
Begreifen I. Nonetheless for Schlegel it is self-evident that the immediacy of knowledge must be saved; what was needed for this was a
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break with the Kantian doctrine, according to which it is solely and
uniquely intuitions that guarantee immediate knowledge einzig and
allein Anschauungen unmittelbare Erkenntnis gewahren I."' Such a
formulation preserves a demand for immediacy even as it would indicate reflexion's break with Kantian intuitionism. When a slightly later
passage asserts that Schlegel seeks "a non-intuitive, intuition of the
system [eine unanschauliche Intuition des Systemsj, and he finds it in
language.
Schlegel's thought is an absolutely conceptual, i.e.
linguistic one lein absolut begrffJ7iches, d.h. sprachlichesl" ( GS, 1.1,
47), the linkage between a conceptual system, an immediacy of
knowledge, and a break with intuitionism emerges as language.
Without entering into the many difficulties of the entire dissertation, it
can be seen that this paradoxical claim for a "non-intuitive intuition"
found in language links up with Benjamin's contemporary claim, in
the programmatic text on the "Coming Philosophy," for "the
linguistic essence of knowledge."
A last provisional step may be taken in this selective outline of
Benjamin's early philosophic writing. As is well known, the
"Epistemo-critical Preface" to his book Origin of the German
Trauerspiel rejects both "knowledge"(Erkenntnis)and the pairing of
the term "concept" with that of "system," in favor of "representation" (Darstellung) and "idea." The rejection of "knowledge," as a
merely acquisitive or possessive category, is anticipated in an earlier
essay on language, a text to which I will turn briefly near the end of this
paper; and the argument on behalf of "representation." and
specifically the self-representation of truth in ideas, is a complex one
that deserves its separate treatment." Here, a point to note is simply
that what Benjamin considers the proper object of philosophy.
namely, the representation of ideas, is said to appear for observation
(Betrachtung), and specifically to appear as images (Bader):
Within Benjamin's early philosophic work, then, one may
discern a move from knowledge via intuitions, to knowledge of knowledge's so-called linguistic essence (while still preserving a claim to
immediacy), as well as a move from knowledge as acquisition or
possession to the observation of self-representational imagery.
Within his oeuvre, the move was said to be one from philosophy as the
theory of knowledge (Erkenntnistheorie) to philosophic criticism as
the close but still theoretical reading of literary language and images.
For our purposes, these shifts in Benjamin's terms and aims may be
reconstrued as a shift from knowing to reading. all the while along an
I

.

.

.
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axis of immediate intuition turning into some other kind of insight or
observation: in traditional terms, this shift encompasses the
philosophic notions of aisthesis as a primordial "seeing" or senseperception, and thedrein as a privileged "sight" or siting and insight of
knowledge. If Benjamin gives up intuition as a means of knowledge of
language, and gives up any notion of a "conceptual system" as an
adequate form for language, then what does he come to see in the
reading of verbal or linguistically constructed images? I am going to
argue that the entire move from a philosophic theory of knowledge to a
critical reading of images is, for Benjamin as well as for us, a matter of
seeing reading. That this occurs along a trajectory from thematic
treatments of fate and of remembering and forgetting, to structural insights into the fate and forgetting of reading, it is the project of this
paper to demonstrate. What began as epistemological assumptions
(Voraussetzungen) or conditions of possiblity for (any possible)
theory (whatsoever), turns into the theoretical insight into what is set
out in advance (vorausgesetzt) for knowledge: insight into its fate.
What a theory of knowledge sees when it sees its knowledge is its
Voraussetzung: its assumption, and the assumption of its fate. How
can Benjamin's theory of knowledge be said, in his early writings, to
see its fate? The 1920-21 essay titled "Fate and Character" may be
taken as exemplary. In this essay, he poses the term and theme of fate
in its relation to possible kinds of knowledge. The essay actually
begins with what Benjamin calls the common view that would link
knowledge of character, together with knowledge of events of the
external world ("das Weltgeschehen," later "die Aussenwelt"), to
predictive knowledge of fate, character being "commonly viewed" as
having a causal relation to fate." The essay quickly dismisses the
causality, and its second paragraph similarly dismisses the ostensibly
clean conceptual distinction between inner man and outer world: the
remainder of the essay attempts a reconceptualization of fate and
character within distinctly different spheres. Some aspects of its revisionary attempt shall be of interest later in this paper, but here the task
is first to look closely at what the first paragraph actually says and
shows about knowledge of fate.
As if in immediate conjunction with the opening thought of
character causally determining fate and yielding knowledge of it.
Benjamin writes that "an immediate intellectual access to the concept of fate" ("Einen unmittelbaren gedanklichen Zugang zum
Schicksalsbegriff ") is not possible within our current notions, so we
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moderns must evidently accept instead the thought of access to
character. What kind of access is this? It is a reading of traits (or features), specifically those of the body. Whatever that "immediate
intellectual access" to knowledge of fate which is denied us might
have been, this access to knowledge of character through reading is
linked to the former denial (note that "daher moderne'Menschen sich
einlassen" ("therefore modern people accept"(), yet it scarcely seems
any more nearly immediate: it too, after all, is a reading of surface,
bodily features. And yet immediate knowledge of and access to
character are then immediately asserted: the sentence continues, once
again linking knowledge of character and knowledge of fate, "because
!modern men] somehow find knowledge of character as such before
them, in themselves 'well sie das Wissen urn Charakter uberhaupt
irgendwie in sich vorfinden] while the notion of analogously reading
the fate of a man out of the lines of his hand seems unacceptable to
them lwahrend die Vorstellung, analog etwa das Schicksal eines
Menschen aus den Linien seiner Hand zu lesen, ihnen unannehmbar
erscheint]." This concluding half of the sentence not only relinks the
reading of character and the reading of fate by way of their contrast
of their acceptability), but also posits a twofold aspect to
knowledge of character: it is a reading of signs ("aus den Zugen zu
lesen"), and yet also knowledge ofits object found, as it were, before
the reading; and within themselves, not in external traits or features
("sie das Wissen um Charakter in sich vorfinden"). They, the modern
men, already know character within themselves before they read it
from without.
This assertion of mediated knowledge founded upon premediational or immediate knowledge is said only of knowledge of character: an analogous relation within knowledge of fate is said to be (or
appear) unacceptable. Benjamin then heightens this unacceptability:
"This appears as impossible as it appears impossible 'to predict the
future' (Dies scheint so unmoglich wie es unmoglich scheint, 'die
Zukunft vorauszusagen]." The sustained contrast between knowledge of character and knowledge of fate-the reading of the former,
the unacceptability of an analogous reading of the latter-is now
defined according to a second register: the claim for reading surface or
bodily traits of character because knowledge of it is found before and
within one appears to invoke a contemporaneous and spatial axis of
inside and outside, whereas reading from similar features to knowledge of fate would move on a temporal axis from the present-at-hand
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to the future. And yet what about the "vorfinden" of knowledge of
character? Is this immediacy ("in sich") really so atemporal? Indeed,
an implicit temporal dimension in the knowing and reading of character is immediately made explicit: the contrast between knowing
character and knowing fate is said to be one between knowing from the
past and present, and not knowing from the present to the future; the
"telling-in- advance of fate" ("die Voraussage des Schicksals") is
subsumed to predicting the future-the impossibility of which is
suggested-allowing character to appear as "something lying before
[us' in the present and past" ("etwas in Gegenwart and Vergangenheit Vorliegendes")-and as such, "therefore knowable" ("also
erkennbar"). One can read between the present and present-at-hand
and the past. but one cannot read from the present to the saying-inadvance of the future.
It is evident that, in looking at Benjamin's theories of knowledge
here-be they of knowledge of character, or of fate-one is seeing a
theory of reading. Another way of posing his question, then, is to ask
what distinguishes the reading of character from that of fate, for both
read signs. Yet the reading of character seems to find something else
as well: not just the traits or features at hand, or on the body, but
"knowledge of character" ("das Wissen um Charakter"), or even
character itself as something lying before one. But as the repeated use
of "seems" or "appears" ought to indicate-Benjamin casts these
opening sentences under the ambivalent aegis of scheinen and erscheinen-he is about to revise this apparent contrast between the two
kinds of reading. "But," his next sentence begins, "it is precisely the
claim of those who profess to predict men's fate from whatever
signs . . ."-and then what? What follows will be Benjamin's restatement of reading fate, in such a way that the apparent differences
between it and the reading of character collapse, while the structure of
either-or any-reading emerges more clearly.
One who professes to predict fate from signs is said to be one
"who knows how to notice it (one who finds before him, in himself, an
immediate knowledge of fate as such) [der darauf zu merken wisse
(der ein unmittelbares Wissen urn Schicksal tiberhaupt in sich
vorfindet)I." The phrasing unmistakably reduplicates the language
describing an immediate knowledge of character used several sentences earlier, and thus the difference between the two kinds of knowledge and reading appears collapsed. But this formulation adds a new
element: "der darauf zu merken wisse." How does one understand, or
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translate, merken here? Those who (claim to) know how to predict
fate from signs know how to read them-this much has been said
already-but what do they notice or note, mark or remark? They do
not notice "fate in itself," anymore than they could notice "character
in itself": a few lines later, it reads: "like character, fate, too, can be
apprehended !surveyed' only in signs, not in itself zwar kann ebenso
wie der Charakter auch das Schicksal nur in Zeichen, nicht an sich
uberschaut werdeni." "Knowing how to mark or notice it" means
knowing to notice or remark upon the mark of a prediction: it is
knowing how to read signs that "speak out in advance"
("vorhersagen") of their temporal location. The merken is simply, as
it were, the seeing of signs, but not so much their sheer perception or
visual sighting, but their observation as signs: as notes or marks.
Whatever "perception" there might be here is a seeing or sensing of
signs as signifying (in this case, as signifying ahead of themselves).
When the sentence then parenthetically adds that such a person
"finds before him, in himself, an immediate knowledge of fate," what
he finds before him are signs that speak-or spoke-before their time.
Noting signs, "reading" them qua signs and thus as significant, is
"knowing" fate through signs. It is also knowing how to read.
The "immediate knowledge of fate as such" comes second, not
only in the syntax of the sentence structure but also in its logical
sequence. What is seen are signs, signs that speak out ahead of themselves, which means that they must be noted and read. But if the signs'
speaking in advance is the very constitution of the mode of existence
of fate in the present, then to have "immediate knowledge of fate as
such" is to know that one has noted signs qua signs-to have "read."
in some sense, that they are readable. The object of knowledge here is
not "fate," but fate in and as signs: as the object of the notation or
merken, they are "already found" or "found before" one: orfinden.
The difficulty with what this sentence asserts is in the use of "immediacy." The signs were there in advance, marked in or on the body
they had only to be noted as readable-but the "immediacy" of
knowledge of fate is then retrospectively posited as already there, as
the immediate or prior and founding object of knowledge. The difficult but real distinction is not between an unmediated seeing-but-notyet-reading and then a knowledge of how to read, but rather between
reading and then, nachiraglich, knowing how to read.9 The knowledge that comes with reading signs of fate calls its own production an
immediacy: it posits a moment or things before this knowledge. But

-
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what is "found before" it, are the signs it already knew how to note or
to mark, because they were read.
Thus, when the sentence concludes that for those who know how
to predict fate, for those who know how to mark or note it, fate is "in
some manner present or-more cautiously said-in place," what was
formerly a proleptic condition-the future to be predicted-is now
collapsed into a present condition of signs at hand or in place, and a

retrospective knowledge of their so-called immediacy. The structure
of saying-forward or -in-advance ("vorauszusagen")-predicting the
future-and then seeing, as if "back," to what is at hand, already
inscribed, is a structure of reading signs that speak forward and convert, or are read back, retrospectively, as providing the knowledge of
how to read what was at hand yet in advance of this very knowledge.
The knowledge so constituted is not the object of some immediate
intuition (Anschauung), but of an uberschauen, an apprehension or
surveying of signs. Even the sign or trait "lying immediately before
one's eyes" ("unmittelbar vor Augen liegen") means nothing,
Benjamin says, but the interconnection of sign and knowledge that is
in place only in signs, "laid upon the immediately visible" ("tiber dem
unmittelbar Sichtbaren gelegen"). The immediacy of knowledge is
not seen or seeable-in place-except as it is sighted/sited beneath or
behind the signs that produce or yield the knowledge.
There are no causal connections here-Benjamin says this
much-nor any apparently causal sequence of present or anterior immediacy and then a subsequent or posterior unfolding of a reading or
interpretation. Fate is read, noted as significant signs, and this is
knowledge of fate as at hand, present, or in place. It is fate that we
learn to read, by which is meant both understandings of this proposition. It is the concept of fate-foretelling something in advance-that
we come to read and know when we learn to read. And it is our fate
that, upon noting signs, we are-as if fated-to learn to read.
This is a difficult point in Benjamin's thought, and the exegetical
remarks thus far have perhaps served to occlude as much as they have
sought to explicate. A turn to another early text may clarify what the
stakes are for Benjamin and for his readers. In a passage from
Einbahnsirasse titled "Madame Ariane zweiter Hof links," written
within a few years of the "Fate and Character" essay, Benjmain tries
to distinguish kinds of treatment of signs and thereby to reintroduce a
distinction between fate and character that his opening paragraph of
the essay had, as a structure of reading, appeared to collapse. To ask
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of the future-as the reader of fate might before its signs-is,
unknowingly, at the cost of a more precise, more inner knowledge of
what is coming (GS, 11.1 [vol. 101, 141-42). The passage privileges a
vitalist, energetic vocabulary unlike that of the paragraph previously
ahnlich
als" )
examined, as it contrasts ("nichts sieht weniger
being present at the revelation of one's fate with the quick grasp that
.

.

.

.

.

.

("stellt-) the future. The future is grasped in a quick present
moment and yields, as its "extract." "presence of mind" ( "Geistesgegenwart"). And this grasping of a future in and into a present
moment or even a second that achieves or fulfills something ("genau
zu merken, was in der Sekunde sich vollzieht ") is favorably
contrasted to merely knowing a distant future ("Fernstes
vorherzuwissen"). In terms of the temporal structure of the "Fate and
Character" paragraph, this initial contrast would appear to bring the
future "zur Stelle" or "in place" in a present, but also separate off and
denigrate mere "advance knowledge" of a future still separate or
distant in time. Both involve the encounter with signs -"Vorze ichen.
Ahnungen, Signale"-as did both fate and character, and in both
cases these signs are in the body (again as with fate and character), but
here the activities are given opposed and irreconcilable names:
oder .
nutzen, das ist die Frage. Beides aber ist
"deuten
unvereinbar." "Interpretation" gets a bum rap here. "use" a
glamorized one.
What emerges rapidly is that this separation of future and present
is the temporal construal of what, epistemologically, is the condition
of mediation of knowledge by way of signs: a "word or image" that
signifies in advance ("prophecy or warning") is a mediating element
("ein Mittelbares"), but before the knowledge of that future becomes
such a present sign, it has lost its significance or signifying power
namely, a power of greater intimacy or immediacy of knowledge ("die
Kraft, mit der sie uns in Zentrum trifft and zwingt, kaum wissen wir
es . .-). Bringing the future into the present has to happen so quickly,
in a split second, or it happens not at all: should it establish mediating
signs. it loses both significance of the future and a signifying impact
upon the present. The temporal relations of either present signs to future significance, or of present interpretation to any possible linkage
between present and future, are at stake here. Signs, once in place,
seem to yield a paradoxical entzdfern: they decipher themselves, but
the same exteriorizing prefix ent- suggests that they thereby lose or
alienate their very significance in this signification.
poses

.

.

.

.

.

-

.
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Reading, it is clear, is also at risk: to read such signs means to
read them too late. One kind of collapsing of future into present, in a
second of immediacy. has been foregone. and another mediation of
them is too retrospective, too late: it is as if both the present and its
signifying relation to a future are already past. The point to retain here
is that all of this laziness and cowardice and tardiness and the like is on
the part of signs-their interpretation, their mediation, their selfdeciphering, their reading. What signs do is call attention to themselves qua signs, but this process of signification produces the evacuation or loss of their significance; their mediating status between the future to be known and the present of that signification dissolves both
the coming of that future ( it is as if past) and their present significance.
Signs provoke, call forth interpretation and reading, but their mediation and this understanding signify insignificance and misunderstanding-missed understanding.
The retrospective understanding of the knowledge of fate and
character that was established in the essay of that name is what is at
issue here: "language which you only now 'too late understand
Idessen Sprache du erst jetzt verstehstj." The explicit textualization
of that essay. with signs before
a
negative light. If life is a book with a text-signs-there is a second
text or script that glosses the first and emerges only retrospectively, in
remembering. as the signs missed and the missed reading. This second
I

script-signs of their non-signification-is "invisible" ("unsichtbar") until the time of its significance has passed, and "prophetic"
("als Prophetie") only in retrospect, not toward a still-future future.
This is bad fate (and also what Benjamin will come to criticize as a
certain kind of historical reading and thinking).
These signs seem never visible or "in place," except as
remembered as once having been invisible, or returned, too late, to
place ( "zurtickstellen"). What is thereby missed, Benjamin writes, is
the chance to measure and conquer "the fates" ("Den Geschicken").
The collapsed instant of bringing-or not bringing-signs of the future into the grasp of a present is the moment of deciding fate: reading
it "in advance," or only retrospectively; or rather not reading it, but
knowing and using it, or only reading it. The messianic impulse to convert both the future that is coming and this present instant into a Nu of
"fulfilled now" ("eritilltes Jetzt") would be an immediacy of time.
and an immediacy of knowledge: "Geistesgegenwart." The naked
body. like the body on which the signs of fate and character were
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inscribed, becomes the image of this immediacy: and this image is
tellingly located as if before time or history, in "Urzeiten." With this
instrument, one might once, like Scipio, have diverted "signs" and
"images" of a coming fate ("Schreckenszeichen. UnglUcksbild hat
werden wollen") by converting them in and into "true practice": the
body's immediate, instantaneous grasp of itself.
Doing something or not doing it and, only too late, reading; immediacy or mediation; signs grasped or signs interpreted; a future
determined by a now or a future passing through a mediating but
ineffectual present and presence of signs: these are the polarities that
organize this textual passage. It will be clear that forgetting also plays
a role here, even if not a verbally explicit one. The "remembering"
("Erinnerung") that, like ultraviolet light, retrospectively exposes
signs that gloss a book or text of life is predicated upon a forgetting. a
forgetting to see something invisible, or to grasp something immediate and immediately. But the remembering is too late: to remember
is already to have forgotten, and then one might as well forget it
forget remembering, that is. Remembering and forgetting reexpose or
re-present a present that was coming and is no longer: they expose,
develop, and represent a temporality that "true practice" would

-

grasp, pose, and undo.

Forgetting as well as remembering stand on one side of the same
set of polarities, of which a present and presence of immediate knowledge constitute the other side. This juxtaposition brings us to the
closing image of the passage. Time, presented here as each and every
dawning day, lies before us "like a clean shirt," an "incomparably
fine, incomparably tightly woven textile 'tissuel of pure prophecy
Idles unvergleichlich feine, unvergleichlich dichte Gewebe reinlicher
Weissagungi." The "happiness" of this present (day), which is also
that of the immediately coming future-and is furthermore opposed to
the "Ungltick" mentioned just above-depends on whether we know,
have knowledge, to grasp the shirt immediately upon awakening into
time; or conversely, whether we forget.
The curious twist to this textual conclusion is that putting on the
shirt would be like exposing our naked body to fate. Putting on the
shirt strangely forgets that the body is no longer naked, or it
remembers what it is no longer. To put it another way, not to put on the
shirt, to remain naked, would be to fail to grasp the tightly woven text
of prophetic signs which, however, once put on, both covers the
body's signs and is laid over them, as if a retrospective, but tardy gloss.
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Benjamin seems to have forgotten whether he wants to start the day
to start time-naked or clothed, whether he wants to know the signs of
time in his hand's grasp or his "center" or his "organism." or to wear
them on his sleeve in a finely woven text.
But where can one remember Benjamin first posing this image or
textual of textured phophecy, and indeed, within an opposition of
Gluck and Ung luck. happiness and misfortune? It is toward the end of
the essay "Fate and Character," after he has attempted. despite his
initial paragraph, to separate off fate from character, the former into a
sphere of guilt, misfortune, and the demonic world of law ( here one
sees the valorization implied in the "Madame Ariane" passage), the
latter into a sphere of innocence, happiness, and a world of nature.
"Happiness,- he writes. "is
what releases man out of the enchainment of the fates and out of the net of his own fate
aus der
Verkettung der Schicksale and aus dem Netz des eignenr ( GS, 11.1,
174). It is out of this classical image of fabricated fate-chain and
net-that character then attempts to emerge, albeit with difficulty, for
the image does not dissolve instantaneously. "The concept of character," Benjamin writes, "will have to rid itself of those traits that constitute its erroneous connection to the concept of fate. This connection is
established through the notion of a net that can be tightened by knowledge at its will into the firmest weave 'eines durch Erkenntnis beliebig,
bis zum festesten Gewebe, zu verdichtenden Netzes(." "Alongside
the broad underlying traits," he continues. "the trained glance of the
connoisseur of men is supposed to perceive finer and closer connecting traits, until what was apparently a net is tightened into a cloth
Ibis das scheinbare Netz zu einem Tuch gedichtet sell." From chain
to net to cloth, Benjamin is weaving an image of a shirt. But this is what
character is supposed to get out of: "In the threads of this weave 1ln
den Faden dieses Gewebes1 a weak understanding finally believes it
possesses the moral essence of the character concerned, and has
distinguished his good and bad characteristics" ( GS, 11.1, 176-77).
But it is not so easy to disentangle some character from this tightening
web. Even at the end of the essay, when character is asserted to be
"unfolded
sunnily in the brilliance of its single trait" ("entfaltet
sich
sonnenhaft im Glanz seines einzigen Zuges- ), and to be "the
beacon in whose beams the freedom of (his( acts becomes visible,"
Benjamin's text recalls the woven textile scarcely put off: "The
character trait is therefore not the knot in the net" ( GS. 11.1, 178). If
character emerges from the weave of fate into the naked light of
.

.

.

1

.

.

.

.

1

1

.
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its own free visibility, why then does the happy man, a few years later,
get up to be redressed in the tightly woven textile of the shirt? What
has Benjamin forgotten, or remembered?
What Benjamin appears to have forgotten is that the concept of
"character" is a theory of knowledge accessible or "in place" in a
network of relations between signs and their reading: this may be
called a text in the particular instance, textuality in the general; and
this is all in the first paragraph of the "Fate and Character" essay from
which Benjamin then diverts or turns away. A countervailing turn of
forgetting and remembering was seen in the "Madame Ariane"
passage, from grasping the naked, bodily sign away from or in
advance of a fateful and belated reading, to grasping a finely, tightly
woven textile and using it to cover such would-be immediacy. This
whole tissue of fate and character, remembering and forgetting, happiness and misfortune, and images of signs and textures recalls
Benjamin's essay "On the Image of Proust," on which Carol Jacobs
has written finely and densely.'° The essay begins by invoking a
physiognomics, or sign-reading, of both character and fate: "Proust's
image is the highest physiognomic expression that the ceaselessly
growing discrepancy between poetry and life was able to attain.""
When the next paragraph seeks to describe Proust's work not as of a
life as it really was ("wie es gewesen ist," with a dig at Ranke's
historicism), but as of a life as it was remembered ( "erinnert").
Benjamin immediately remembers that he is forgetting something; or
two things, for he immediately adds weaving and forgetting: "For
here, for the remembering author, the main thing is not at all what he
lived, but rather the weaving of his remembering. the Penelope-work
of memory. Or ought one not rather to speak of a Penelope-work of
forgetting?" Having remembered forgetting, he elaborates and
embroiders the image of weaving: "is not this work of spontaneous
memory, in which remembering is the weft and forgetting the warp,
much more a counterpart vein Gegenstuckl to the work of Penelope
than its identical image Isein Ebenbild I?" One needs the warp. first
attached to the loom, before one can have the weft interwoven by the
shuttle, and the analogy suggests that we have forgetting before
remembering: we customarily remember only because we have first

forgotten.
So here. Benjamin's image has remembering weaving upon
forgetting. And yet the image then suddenly swerves, to yield
remembering not weaving, but unweaving or unravelling the textile-
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work of forgetting, wherein forgetting becomes, as it were, the shuttle
as well as the loom: "For here the day unravels what the night worked.
Each morning, awakened, we hold in our hands, for the most part
weakly and loosely, only a few fringes of the tapestry of lived existence such as forgetting has woven it in ourselves wie Vergessen ihn
in uns gewoben hat I." This appears to be a far way from Benjamin's
courageous man's grasping of his finely, tightly woven shirt upon
awakening. Benjamin here pushes the unravelling a step further:
"Each day, with purposeful activity and, even more, with purposive
remembering, unravels the web, the ornaments of forgetting Was
Geflecht. die Ornamente des Vergessensl."
Rather than grasping a textile in advance of a fateful forgetting
and the subsequently belated remembering, the day begins with its
unravelling-work of remembering, the unravelling of the work of
forgetting. A text is a weave, Benjamin reminds his reader, and he
claims there is none "more tight" ("kaum einer mehr and dichter")
than Proust's. And perhaps, Benjamin suggests, this is because Proust
couldn't stop writing: the galleys' margins get filled with more text,
like a textile wherein even the borders are enwoven. But nowBenjamin's text continues-this weaving on is not, as above, the work
of forgetting, but of remembering: "fit isi remembering that here
issues the strict weaving regulations Idle Erinnerung, die hier die
strenge Webevorschrift gibt I" (GS, 11.1, 3 I 2). Benjamin can't seem
to remember whether he has Proust's text (through) remembering or
forgetting. Or as Carol Jacobs puts it. Bejamin has an interweaving of
the two (p. 92).
Why remembering at all Benjamin seems to have asked this
when he appeared to have had forgetting be both loom and shuttle.
Proust desires happiness. Gluck. Benjamin suggests. But not by
emerging out of a net of fateful interconnections that tighten into a
fabric, nor by grasping such a fine, tightly woven piece of textile upon
awakening at daybreak. Rather, this recherche is for what Benjamin
calls "the eternal restoration of the original, first happiness
which
for Proust turns existence into a preserve of memory"( GS. 11. 1.31 3).
But this turning-into or transformation ( erwandeln) is no more a oneway street of remembering than was the initial imagery of weaving by
remembering and forgetting. What Benjamin calls the "bridge" or
"gate" to Proust's dream ( GS, 11.1. 3 13) turns out to be Proust's notion of "similarities," and not just anyone's: "The similarity of one
thing with another, with which we calculate, and which occupies us
I

.
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when awake, only skirts the deeper dream-world in which whatever
happens, never emerges identically, but only similarly -untransparently similar to itself was vorgeht, nie identisch, sondern
ahnlich: sich selber undurchschaubar ahnlich, auftaucht1.-12
Benjamin's claim for Proust's pursuit of happiness has led him,
and his reader, to this crux of non-self-identical self-similarity, along a
path on which both perhaps always already were. That is. the attempt
to correlate Benjamin's disjunctive or disharmonious imagery of fate
and character, reading and seeing or grasping, remembering and
forgetting, may have been predicated upon the assumption that any
one of these was self-identical, so that two or more might then be
similar. But what emerges from the last sentence about Proust is that
any one image may be not only non-self-identical, but of an untransparent, impenetrable similarity to or within itself, such that an
immediate perception or surface-bodily access or grasp to its signs
would always miss its grasp and displace. misplace, or forget.
Benjamin gives one more elaboration to this thought. the well-known
image of the stocking. and it is said to be not a "true practice" of a firm.
courageous grasp, but the "truth-sign," the "Wahrzeichen" of a
labile, childish turning-inside-and-out. The rolled-up stocking is both
outside and inside, container and contained. "pocket" and "present"
within: sign and knowledge. When a "grasp" then appears ("mit
einem G riff ") to turn this two-in-one structure into a third thing ("dies
beides . in etwas Drittes zu verwandeln"), into the stocking, this is
not then the self-identical "real" stocking, but a likeness (specifically.
an analogy) for Proust's image, which. Benjamin continues, is structured like the child's stocking in that a containing-but-unreal "dummy-ego" ("die Attrappe, das Ich") contains a "real life" of memories
and forgetting and yet is neither one nor the other, but is always
emptied so that the image can be brought about and in.
The relation of the child's stocking to Proust's image, or of
Proust's image to the introduction of the more general "image" that
appears at the bottom of the paragraph. is neither identity. nor even
twofold similarity. Each relation has the threefold structure of sign
(token, likeness), meaning. and the "untransparent" similarity
between the two-an untransparency or visibility which this paper
began by addressing as reading. and now turns into imagery. Just as an
outside surface seems to assure a full interior in the child's stocking or
in Proust's representation of character and remembering, and yet gets
turned into a third thing-stocking or image-so did the surface-level.
I

.

.
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visible noting or marking of signs seem to promise a full, immediate
knowledge of character, only to turn into a third thing: the reading of
fate, "seeing" the fate of reading, namely. that we are fated to read, not
see. So. too, one sees here neither surface nor depth, neither mere sign
nor profound meaning. neither immediacy nor interpretive mediation, but "a third": the untransparent relation of both in an image of
reading.
It may appear that, with these remarks. one is far from the
problem of forgetting and remembering. The closing image of the
image seems to present a recirculating relation between three images
of it: the image as a sign ( say. the sign of fate or character, or the
rhetorical vehicle for a tenor in the paragraph on Proust); the image as
meaning (say. the knowledge of fate or character in relation to their
signs); and the relation between the two which is the reading of
images, and thus may be called the imagery of reading. But to the
extent that this is on Proust, remembering is not far behind, and
Benjamin is not far behind Proust. This paragraph is closely echoed in
a passage near the beginning of Benjamin's autobiographical Berliner Chronik. Benjamin is writing of Proust's own role as a model or
influence in Benjamin's "chronicle" or. as he puts it here, "these
memories of my earliest city life":

The renunciation of any playing-around with related possibilities
will scarcely find a more binding embodiment than that of the
translation (of Proust' that I was able to produce. Related
possibilities-do they really exist? They would certainly not
tolerate any playing-around. What Proust began so playfully
became a breathtakingly serious business. Whoever has once
begun to open the fan of memory always finds new wings, new
segments; no image satisfies him, for he has known Ierkannt that
it can be unfolded, and only in its folds does the real thing Was
Eigentliche reside; that image. ."
I

.

.

The "related possibilities" which this passage invokes may allude to
what Benjamin called Proust's "non-identical similarities." But the
transposition (or Ubersetzung) from Proust's image as a stocking to
Benjamin's as a fan is no fooling around. To have said, as Benjamin's
discussion of Proust did, that his imagery and all the relations among
images occur within the transformation ("verwandeln") of existence
into "a preserve of memory" is, in Benjamin's terms, to say that
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the relations among images are the unfolding of the image as the structure and action of remembering: there, the stocking: here, the fan. The

verbal images of "transforming," "emptying out," or "unfolding"
"bring in" ("einbringen") one thing: the image in the discussion of
Proust, knowing ("erkennen") the imagery of the fan of memory in
this passage from Berliner Chronik. In terms of the explication at the
beginning of this paper, the image of (a theory of) knowledge in the
unfolding of a temporality from noting a sign of the future to, retrospectively, seeing the knowledge as an anterior one, is neither just a
claim for immediacy. nor just the display of this first claim under or
through the texture of a structure of reading, but also "a third thing"
("jenes Drittes"): the image of unfolding significant imagery, for what
is known is that no image satisfies, as each is in the folds of an
unfolding.
The unfolding of the image does not end-it does not come fullcircle to a refolding or reinteriorizing, an ultimate Erinnerung-and if
this is memory in Benjamin on Proust, its imagery occurs against a
horizon of forgetting in Benjamin on language. What is meant by this
assertion is that, for all the hopeful imagery of an unfolding of languages toward what he calls "pure language" in several early essays
on language, this sense of a last fullness of the folds is situated against
a backdrop of real, human forgetting. The early essay "On Language
as Such and on the Language of Man," for example. has as its famous
"last word" that "All higher language is the translation of lower ones,
until in ultimate clarity the word of God unfolds entfaltet I. which is
the unity of this movement of language ": and this conclusion has as its
counterpart the methodological avowal, somewhat apologetically put
forth, that in his statements in this essay. "language is presupposed
vorausgesetztl as an ultimate reality, inexplicable and mystical,
observable only in its unfolding or unfoldedness Entfaltungl."" But
as the tension of this translation might suggest-is Enifaliung here the
dynamic of unfolding or the achieved condition of unfoldedness?-or
as the semantic tension between "inexplicable" and "unfolded" also
indicates, this effort toward an image of fully revealed language is
always situated within and against the condition of human language-in the critique delivered in the essay in question. a fallen.
inadequately knowing form of language. In Benjamin's "The Task of
the Translator," an early claim closely echoes the closing statement of
the essay "On Language
.": "In translations the life of the original
attains its ever-renewed, latest and most comprehensive unfolding
I

I

.

.
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Entfaltungl" (GS, IV .1, I 1). But toward the end of this same text,
this image of ongoing unfolding has a less bountiful counterpart.
Holder lin's translations of Sophocles are said to be the image of
translation for all others: "they relate to even the most perfect translations of texts as 'does' the prototype to the model kis das Urbild zum
Vorbild I." And this is, Benjamin continues, as "meaning (Sinn' falls
from abyss to abyss until it threatens to lose itself in the bottomless
depths of language." '5 Whether in the rather benign view of unfolding
or in the rather less benign view of falling, whether in the explicitly
theological thematic of a God's-eye view or in the more human
perspective of inexplicability and loss of meaning, this recurrent
imagery of language's unfolding qua translation is vouchsafed not by
a goal (Ziel) of verbal re-membering (anymore than in the statement
about Proust's unfolding of memory), but by the end (Ende) of human
remembering in a necessarily ongoing forgetting. The relation of
remembering and forgetting in Benjamin is less one of extremeseven of dialectizable extremes-than of a sort of inverse proportionality, wherein both human remembering and human forgetting
occur coordinated on the near side of an absolute non-forgetting,
which latter, however, can never be known, spoken or written." The
process of remembering-remembering an "original," "pure language," say, or an "original" text through its translations-entails
increasing forgetting of all actual, material languages and meanings,
and only what Benjamin calls "an unforgettable" rein Unvergessliches")- what is never forgotten, and therefore never
available to rememberings-allows for what he knows as our languages of forgetting. "Certain relational concepts," he wrote in "The
Task of the Translator," "retain their good, yes, perhaps their best
meaning if they are not straightaway exclusively referred to man.
Thus an unforgettable life or instant could be spoken of, even if all men
had forgotten them" (GS, IV .1, 10).
The unforgettable in Benjamin knows no remembering. This is
not to say that it might not be remembered, or held in memory-this is
always his messianic gesture-simply that it would not be known.
The "near-sided" (diesseitige) temporal structure of verbal
remembering and forgetting is, of course, chastised by Benjamin as an
inauthentic one ("uneigentlich zeitlich"). As he puts it in the "Fate
and Character" essay, "The complete elucidation of these matters
This time can
depends on fixing the particular kind of time in fate.
at every moment be made simultaneous with another (not present). It
1

.
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non-autonomous time, which is parasitically directed toward the
." (GS, 11.1,
time of a higher, less natural life. It has no present
is a

.

176).

Benjamin's "authenticity," if one dare risk this term, is to refuse
to refuse insight into this inauthenticity; but, to paraphrase Paul de
Man, to spot and site inauthenticity is not the same as to know
authentically." The relation of times without any present, which is
what Benjamin's reading and theory of fate expose, is what this paper
has posed as a fate of learning to read. The fate of learning to read is
that everything becomes read, even that which has not (yet) any
present. As Benjamin quoted at least twice from Hofmannsthal (once
in the piece "On the Mimetic Faculty" "Uber das mimetische
Vermogen"1 and again in a draft to the theses "On the Concept of
History" ( " Uber den Begriff der Geschichtel), "Read what was
never written [Was nie geschrieben wurde, lesen I..'" This is not
reading presence or immediacy of knowledge, still less reading the
Messiah, but reading the absence of reading. This vanishing-point,
the forgetting of reading and of being read, is of course readable
throughout secondary literature on Benjamin, and even in some of
limit
Benjamin's own work, as he pushes
to
and
the
most
difficult
instance,
of his imagery. But in the strictest
is
to
read
Benjamin's
injunction
of
reading,
the
read in its effacement
image of his character in the sketch "Der destruktive Charakter." He
writes that the "destructive character is a signal" (GS, IV. I 'vol. 101,
397), hence a sign to be read. Its meaning, he continues, is that "the
destructive character erases even the traces of destruction Iverwischt
sogar die Spuren der Zerstorungl" (GS, IV. I , 397). How does one
read from the sign to the meaning of the sign as its own erasure? This
would yield "character" -the title word of the piece, after all-as if an
immediacy of knowledge in noting the absence of reading (for the sign
"means" that it is erased). But it also yields the trace-the nonpresent, now you see it, now you don't instant-of an erasure even in
the erasure of all traces. This is the "untransparent" or the noninvisible, still-readable relation, the "undurchschaubar" similarity
between noting images of knowing and remembering character and
immediacy, and reading the image of forgetting fate and its reading.
I
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Der Begre der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik, in Walter Benjamin.

I.

Gesammelte Schrifien. Werkausgabe. ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhauser ( Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), I.1 ( Werkausgabe Vol. I ). 15. Henceforth
cited as GS with volume and page numbers.
2.
Letter to Gerhard Scholem, 7 December 1917. in Walter Benjamin. Briefe, ed.
Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno ( Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag. 1966). Vol.

p. 158.

"Ober das Programm der kommenden Philosophic," GS, 11.1 (vol. 4). 168.
For the documentation, see the letters of June 1917. 22 October 1917, 7
December 1917, 23 December 1917. I February 1918. 30 March 1918. and May
1918 (all to Gerhard Scholem except the last, to Ernst Schoen). in Brie e, I: pp. 137.
3.

4.

138. 151. 152. 159. 161. 176. 179. 180. 188.
5.

GS, 1.1. 32; see also 21 and 29.

6.

Ursprung des deutschen Thauerspiels. GS,

1.1

(vol.

1

).

207-14. For

a

more

extended discussion of representation in the "Erkenntniskritische Vorrede," see my

"Death and Authority, End and Origin: Benjamin's 'Storyteller' Essay and
Thauerspiel Book," the last chapter of my Allegories of History: Literary
Historiography after Hegel (forthcoming).
7.
GS, 1.1: 210, 214, 215. That these images (Bilder) might not be mistaken for
copies (Abbilder) of an existing reality. see also Benjamin's "Die Aufgabe des
Ubersetzers." GS, IV. I (vol. 10), 12, where critical epistemology (Erkenntniskritik)
is invoked to assert the proof of the impossibility of a theory of copies (Abbilder).
8.
"Schicksal und Charakter," GS. 11.1 (vol. 4), 171. Subsequent quotations from
this essay in the next six paragraphs arc from pp. 171 and 172.
9.

In his dissertation (GS 1.1: 32, 33, n. 48). Benjamin makes

regarding the relation between Anschauung and

a

similar argument

Weston in Fichte: "weil das

abso-

lute Ich seiner unmittelbar sich bewusst ist, nennt Fichte den Modus. in dem es sich er-

scheint. Anschauung, und wed es sich seiner in der Reflexion bewusst ist, wird diese

Anschauung mtellektuell genannt. Das bewegende Motiv dieses Gedankenganges liege
in der Reflexion: sic ist der wahre Grund der Unmittelbarkeit der Erkenntnis und erst

nachtraglich wird

diese als Anschauung bezeichnet" (emphasis added).
Carol Jacobs. The Dissimulating Harmony: The Image of Interpretation in
Nietzsche. Rake. .4rtaud and Benjamin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
.

.

.

10.

1978). pp. 87-110.

II.

"Zum Bilde Prousts." GS.

11.1

(vol. 4), 311. Subsequent quotations from this

essay. unless noted in the text. are from this same page.
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314. Subsequent quotations from this essay in the next paragraph are

from this same page.
13.

Berliner Chronik, ed. Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970).

p. 14.

"Ober Sprache uberhaupt und fiber die Sprache des Menschen," GS. 11.1 (vol.
14.
4), 157 and 147. For uses of the term and image of Enffaltung, in which philosophy and
religion are coordinated, see "Uber das Programm der kommenden Philosophic." GS,
11.1, 163 and 170:

"Die Philosophic beruht darauf dass

in der Struktur der Erkenntnis

die der Erfahrung liegt und aus ihr zu entfalten ist. Diese Erfahrung umfasst denn auch
die Religion, namlich als die wahrc. wobei weder Gott noch Mensch Objekt oder

Subjekt der Erfahrung ist, wohl aber diese Erfahrung auf der reinen Erkenntnis beruht
als deren lnbegriff allein die Philosophic Gott denken kann und muss"; and "Es gibt
auf die rich der Erkenntnisbegriff als Lehre in
aber eine Einheit der Erfahrung
seiner kontinuierlichen Entfaltung unmittelbar bezieht. Der Gegenstand und Inhalt
dieser Lehre, diese konkrete Totalitat der Erfahrung ist die Religion. die aber der

Philosophic zunachst nur als Lehre gegeben 1st."
GS, IV.1. 25. Cf. Paul de Man." 'Conclusions' on Walter Benjamin's 'The Task
15.
of the Translator,' " Yale French Studies, No. 69 (1985), pp. 38-39: "where it is said
that Holderlin tumbles in the abyss of language. you should understand the word
'abyss' in the non-pathetic, technical sense in which we speak of a mise en abyme structure, the kind of structure by means of which it is clear that the text itself becomes an
example of what it exemplifies."
16.

Cf. de Man, "Conclusions."

p. 44:

"any work

is

totally fragmented in relation to

this reine Sprache. with which it has nothing in common, and every translation is totally
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